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 MISTAKES OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION STRATEGIC COMMAND

MISTAKES OF ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION STRATEGIC COMMAND

The main problem of the Ukrainian anti-terrorist operations command is very slow threat analysis and assessment. It is very sad that even after the tragic lessons of fighting in the Sector D, the command did not make proper conclusions from it. We must think fast, we have to work with data sets. If you assess the situation in terms of operational art, the following errors are obvious.

Censor.NET editor-in-chief Yurii Butusov points out the following mistakes:.

1 Lack of concentration of forces. The essence of the art of war is to concentrate superior forces in the enemy's most vulnerable point. The purpose of the art of war is the destruction of manpower and hardware of the enemy. That is why the most effective kind of attack is covering the flanks and encirclement. The Ukrainian troops do conducted encirclement operations. Even when there are favorable conditions - in Sloviansk, for example. There the ATO command actually allowed the main mercenary forces to slip out of the operational encirclement. Instead of scoping and the destroying the enemy forces, the ATO troops are expulsing them. The main criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the commanders should be not the raising of the flag over some city council but only the number of neutralized enemies; with the obligatory photo and video.

2 I call the strategy of the ATO forces the "strategy of wheat cream" - when the available forces are smeared throughout the front and the density if combat formations is lost without the provision for reserves. As a result, when our troops find the enemy, they cannot immediately neutralize them with fire and destroy them completely because groups of Russian mercenaries often have the same firepower as our troops. With its enormous organizational benefits - the possibility of implementing military units as part of the brigades, i.e. the possibility to concentrate all forces and means, the ATO command itself reduces the impact strength of its units, spreading the brigades to dozens of minor tasks. The forces must act with fists, not splayed fingers!

3. Cordon strategy. Strategy of roadblocks was adequate to the situation around April-May. Then control of the territory by placing a large number of posts, each of which covered a tank, an infantry fighting vehicle or an armored personnel carrier was logical, since one armored car could scare off any number of thugs with guns. Today, Russian mercenaries are using whole groups of tanks and armored vehicles as well as artillery. Roadblocks on the front line has evolved from a means of controlling and containing into a convenient target. Obviously, the control function in the frontal zone should be conducted by mobile units, which operate primarily covertly, are not tied to one place, and use primary and alternate positions. Instead of mindless and safe for Russian subversive groups territory control, we should switch to the creation of operational bases of fire support, in conjunction with which large armored units and detachments of special forces carry out search-and-strike actions with immediate artillery and air support in their area of responsibility. The checkpoints are only needed in the cities. In case of revealing subversive groups, the district must be swept by large mechanized units. There should be only one strategy - "search and destroy".

4 Excessive centralization of tactical management. ATO command operation plans all the way to managing battalions, to appointing borders, to which specific forces should come to at specific time. It's uncomfortable to talk about it, but this method of planning an offensive was abandoned by European armies in 1918, and completely stamped out in the Soviet army after 1942. Tactical command should act within the framework of the general task but have room for maneuver and freedom of concentrating available forces and means.

5 Lack of flexibility. General Staff and ATO command are extremely slow to respond to changes in the strategic environment. Operation of shutting down the state border was feasible in June. However, under the conditions of Russia's factual entry into the war, with Russia invading the border areas, and protecting transport corridors of the terrorists in these areas, the change of this strategy is long overdue. Nevertheless, the fighting at the border continues, which as a result of constant fire of the Russian artillery, which we cannot respond to, causes very large losses of our troops.

6 The lack of connectivity points in operational planning. A point of connectivity is that point in fighting the enemy lines, the taking of which will defeat the enemy and his resistance will be rendered impossible. Today it is necessary to concentrate all forces to capture the points which terrorists will not dare to leave without a fight. These are Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian artillery cannot reach it from the territory of the Russian Federation. There will be no LPR and DPR without their capitals. If the General Staff finally concentrates the troops in strike groups, and instead of placing the checkpoints will strike the enemy with large forces, the war will end soon. If any city occupied by terrorists will be struck by a simultaneous attack from the flanks and the rear by the 4-5 mechanized and airmobile brigades, each reinforced with one or two volunteer battalions - no city, captured by the enemy, can resist for even 48 hours. The fall of Luhansk and Donetsk will really bring us closer to victory. This will boost the morale of the troops exhausted by many months of standing at checkpoints and demoralize the enemy. Taking of Luhansk and Donetsk are quite doable tasks within one month. And sweeping got remaining groups will be much easier in the fall - the "green" will disappear and the enemy's ability to conduct raids and ambushes will be greatly reduced.

Yurii BUTUSOV

 
 
 
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